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640                                                                      RAPID POPULATION GROWTH-II
diately to a level that will ultimately bring a stationary population, we find that substantial growth still occurs. Because of age distributions favorable to fertility, total numbers would continue to rise, by two thirds in the faster growing parts of the world. These regions are in the grip of a kind of demographic inertia: populations that are growing rapidly have, by virtue of that growth, age distributions favorable to reproduction. Even if fertility falls to a stationary level, such regions continue to grow for at least 50 years before tapering off to their stationary values at 60 percent or more above the present numbers. If the adoption of the stationary birth rates is postponed even as little as 15 years, the increase to stationarity would be not 60 percent but nearly 150 percent.
Today's developing countries differ from the developed ones in growing up to five times as fast-say 3.5 percent per year against 0.7 percent per year. More surprising, they differ strikingly from Europe in the 18th century. The typical developing country of today has decidedly lower death rates and much higher birth rates than did European countries when they were on the road to development.
The result is a high dependency burden today; numerous young children add to the difficulties that the capital-poor countries have in accumulation. That this can be contrasted with the rich countries of today is widely known, but the comparison with 18th century Europe is less familiar. The analysis in this paper seeks to find to what degree the advantage of 18th century Europe was due to its lower birth rates and to what extent to its higher death rates; apparently the birth rate differences had more than twice as much influence on childhood dependency as had death rate differences.
The effect of changes in age-specific death rates on ultimate overall increase is found to be small. For example, a one-time decline of death rates at ages past reproduction has no effect at all on the ultimate population increase. Moreover, with modern low mortality the elimination of all remaining deaths up to the end of reproductive life would only slightly increase the growth.
Death rates are subject to policy decisions, for example, on whether funds are to be spent on heart research (for the older population) or accident prevention (for the younger). However, births are more easily affected by policy. Because the dissemination of birth control information and materials strikes the several ages unequally, it is worthwhile to derive formulas for the effects of reduction in the birth rate at different ages of mothers. Because some women die after the age of 20 and before 40, the reduction of the birth rate at the younger age will have more consequence for the rate of natural increase. For a population that is rapidly increasing, however, this is lessh to prove troublesome. control. Dr. Hilton Salhanick has observed that some women practicing the rhythm method will break or lose their thermometers at the critical juncture in theirright, therefore alwayshas some c